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FOREWORD
/~T~y HERE is uncertainty in the minds of many people as to 
who pays for the AAA corn-hog program. The question 
is not who ;pays the costs of administration; that is a compara­
tively unimportant matter. The question, or rather, series of 
questions, is, who actually pays the hog processing tax of $2.25 
per 100 pounds—the packer, the producer, or the consumer! 
And will a reduction in corn and hog production mean more 
total income for the corn-hog farmer, or less"! If it will mean 
more income, from whom will the increased income be taken— 
from the packer and other distributors, or from the consumers ? 
Or will it perhaps be taken from no one, but from a general 
increased production all-round resulting from the partial res­
toration of agriculture’s purchasing power!
These questions are not easy to answer, and various con­
flicting opinions concerning them have been expressed. There 
is need for an unbiased, impartial treatment of the subject, 
which will draw attention to (1) the factors which are in­
volved (2) a way of thinking through the relationships among 
these factors, and (3) a concrete and definite statement of the 
tentative conclusions which can be drawn on the basis of exist­
ing information. The present bulletin is an attempt to meet 
this need.1
irThe bulletin is based upon a somewhat technical statistical analysis 
that was published in an article entitled, “The Incidence of the Cost 
of the AAA Corn-Hog Program” in the July, 1934, issue of the Journal 
of Farm Economics. The present bulletin presents the same material, 
but in less technical form.
3
Shepherd: Prospects for agricultural recovery VIII. Who pays for the hog re
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1933
Prospects for A gricu ltural  Recovery
VIII. Who Pays for the Hog Reduction Program?2
By Geoffrey Shepherd
The purpose of the AAA corn-hog reduction program is to 
increase the incomes of corn and hog farmers. To finance the 
program, the Federal Government has levied a processing tax 
which now amounts to $2.25 per hundred pounds on hogs.3 
This tax is collected from the packers when the hogs are slaugh­
tered or processed.
The objective of the program is to increase the income of 
corri' and hog farmers by reducing the production of corn and 
hogs. A substantial part of the foreign demand for United 
States’ hog products has disappeared, apparently for some 
years to come. The AAA proposes to meet this reduction in 
demand by a reduction in supply. This reduction in supply is 
to be accomplished by the payment of ' ‘benefit payments” to 
those farmers who sign contracts specifying that they will re­
duce their hog production 25 percent and their own corn pro­
duction between 20 and 30 percent.
THE TWO CHIEF PROBLEMS
The question as to who pays for this program, in the sense 
of who bears the burden of it, is not one question but two ques­
tions. First, who really pays the processing tax on hogs? And 
second, who suffers from the reduced production and therefore 
consumption of hogs? These are two separate questions; the
2The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Oris V. Wells, of the Pro­
duction Control Seption of the AAA, Mr. Frederic V. Waugh and Mr. 
Preston Richards of the Division of Statistical and Historical Research, 
and Mr. Gerald B. Thorne of the Corn and Hog Section of the AAA 
for the valuable suggestions which they contributed. He is also in­
debted to his colleagues at Iowa State College, to Mr. Keith Kirk­
patrick who prepared all the statistical tables and graphs (many of 
which do not appear in this bulletin) and to Mr. Alvin Coons, who re­
wrote most of the original technical manuscript in everyday non­
technical language.
3When the tax was first applied, on Nov. 5, 1933, it was relatively 
small, 50 cents p^r 100 lbs. Since then it has been increased step by 
step to its present figure, $2.25. A tax of 5 cents a bushel is also levied 
on the small amount of corn that is processed in cornstarch, glucose 
and sugar factories.
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corn-hog program cannot be judged by studying only one of 
them.
The present bulletin is divided into two major parts corre­
sponding to these two major questions. The one part deals 
with the burden or incidence of the processing tax in the early 
stages of the program before a reduction in hog production 
has been effected, and the other deals with the burden of the 
reduction after it has been put into effect and begins to show 
up in reduced market receipts of hogs.
The objective of this bulletin is to determine who really pays 
for the corn-hog reduction program—who really bears the bur­
den of the tax and of the reduced production of hogs. This 
objective cannot be fully attained, because of the limitations of 
the data available, the small amount of research done, and the 
many angles from which the whole subject must be considered 
to get a complete picture. The bulletin, therefore, is only a 
preliminary report. It will simply point out the factors that 
need to be considered, and outline broad and tentative answers; 
it will indicate the lines along which further research is needed 
before complete and exhaustive answers can be given.
WHO PAYS THE HOG PROCESSING TAX?
The first question is, who really pays the hog processing tax? 
On the surface, it looks as if the packers were il paying the 
tax.” But a great many people are not so sure. The tax is 
paid over by the packers, it is true, but the burden of the tax 
does not necessarily fall on the packers. The thrifty American 
housewife, who figuratively represents the consumers of the 
country, watches her meat bill suspiciously to see if the packers 
are not passing the burden on to her in the form of higher 
prices for meat; while the farmer in the Corn Belt, with an eye 
on the depressed livestock market, inquires if he is not the 
one who really pays the tax.
Let us consider the packers first. Bo they pay the tax out 
of their own operating margins ? (An operating margin is the 
difference between the price paid for 100 pounds of live hog 
and the amount received from the products obtained from 
them.) •
The answer to this question is fairly easy to find. Figure 1 
provides a background for it; the chart shows packers’ mar-
5
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gins since Jan. 1, 1924.4 It shows what they paid for hogs per 
100 pounds and'what they received for the products of 100
4This figure is taken from, an article by F. V. Waugh, “Margins in 
Marketing,” Journal of Farm Economics, April, 1934, p. 240.
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Fig. 2. Packers’ margins at Chicago. September, 1933, to May, 1934.
pounds of hog—meats, lard, tankage, etc. It shows that the 
margin has been slowly declining since 1926. It also shows 
that there is a seasonal fluctuation in the margin, although most 
of the fluctuation disappears when the price of hogs is lagged 
one month; that is, the packer may purchase the live hog in 
January, but the products are not ready for sale until later, 
and the margin should be figured on that basis, if hog prices 
vary in the meantime.
The secretary of agriculture announced the hog processing 
tax in October, 1933. The packers’ margins from the time of 
that announcement to the present are shown in fig. 2.5 This 
chart shows that whenever the tax was increased the packers 
suffered a loss for a few days; but shortly they widened their 
margin by an amount equal to the tax.
On the whole, then, the margin between the price the 
packer paid for hogs and the price he received for his hog 
products has increased with the increase in the processing tax 
levied on the packers. The margin for the two most recent 
months, May ajid June, 1924, is $2.30 wider than for the months 
preceding the imposition of any tax in the fall of 1933. The 
increase in the margin is therefore practically identical with 
the amount of the processing tax. One thing, then, is evident. 
The packers are not bearing the burden of the tax directly by
““Agricultural Adjustment.” Report of Administration of the AAA, 
May, 1933, to February, 1934. AAA, 1934, p. 245, Recent data direct 
from Gerald B. Thorne; originally from C. A. Burmeister.
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taking it out of their operating margins. They are simply wid­
ening their margin by an amount equal to the tax, thereby 
either passing the tax on to the consumer or élse back to the 
producer, or a measure of both.
Which way is the packer passing the tax-—-forward to the 
consumer in the form of higher prices for meat,6 or backward 
to the producer in the form of lower prices for hogs ?
THE TAX IS NOT SHIFTED TO THE CONSUMER
To find out whether or not the processing tax has been passed 
on to the consumer in the early stages of thè corn-hog program 
before hog supplies are reduced, it is not enough to study just 
the retail prices to see if they have increased since October, 
1933. Industrial conditions have improved since then, and re­
tail pork product prices would have risen in any case; pur­
chasing power has increased, and people are bidding higher 
for meat.
The question can be answered, however (although the answer 
is only preliminary, pending further research), by examining 
the market figures which show the nature of the demand for 
pork—that is, the amount of money people are willing to pay 
for pork before they will pass it up at the meat counter and 
choose cheaper meats or meat substitutes. For simplicity, the 
question will be discussed first without taking into account the 
effect of the Federal Government’s purchases of lightweight 
pigs in the late summer of 1933. The effect of those purchases 
will then be brought in later.
What is “ the nature of the demand for pork” mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph? We all know that when the produc­
tion of pork is high, the price falls; and When the production 
is low and there is a scarcity of pork, the price rises. But how 
much does the price rise and fall?
The statistics covering the years from 1921 to 1933 show 
that the relation between pork production and pork prices is 
one to one. That is, an increase of 10 percent in the production
Throughout this bulletin the discussion centers on packers’ margins, 
with little reference to other distributive margins (for example, those 
of the retailer). There are two reasons for this. The processing tax is 
levied on the packer, not on the retailer; the packer is, therefore, most 
directly affected. And it is likely that retailers’ margins will remain 
substantially unaffected by the program.
8
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DELATION OF RETAIL PRICE O F 
PORIC TO C O N S U M PT IO N  O F PORIC 
( 1 9 2 1 - 3 0  = IOO).
of pork causes a decrease of 10 percent in the price of pork. 
Similarly, a decrease of 10 percent in production causes an in­
crease of 10 percent in price. This is illustrated in diagram­
matic form in fig. 3, 
which shows the consum­
er ’s demand curve for 
pork.
This demand curve 
shows that if packers at­
tempt to pass on the tax 
by raising prices to the 
consumers, the consumers 
will simply buy less pork.
When it becomes evident 
to the housewife that too 
great a portion of her 
budget is going for pork 
she will pass it up at the 
meat counter and substi­
tute other foods. As
9 0  IOO IIO
C O N S U M P T IO N  (PE R C E N T )
Fig. 3. Relation of retail price of pork 
to consumption of pork, 1921-33.
more and more pork remains unsold, excess supplies will pile 
up in storage and, to get rid of this excess, the packers 
will be forced to lower the price.7 Packers (or any other pro­
ducers or processors) can set the quantity they wish to sell, 
but the public then sets the price at which it will take that 
quantity; or packers can set the price at which they will sell, 
but the public then sets the quantity it will take at that price. 
Any attempt to raise prices simply results in unsalable sur­
pluses accumulating until the pressure of those surpluses brings 
the price down again to a figure that will move all the product 
into consumption.8
7In fact, since a large proportion of pork products is fresh pork 
(which cannot be stored) it is the threat of unsalable supplies rather 
than the actual pressure of actual surpluses, that brings or rather 
keeps the price down.
8Mr. Frederick V. Waugh, of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
at Washington, commented in a letter to the author just before this 
bulletin went to press, “I think it might be well to point out some­
where in this section that these conclusions are verified by a study 
of market data. For example, the retail price of pork products in 
November, December and January was almost exactly in line with 
the prices we would ordinarily expect considering the volume of sales 
of pork products and consumer incomes.”
9
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In the first stages of the corn-hog program, therefore, before 
hog production is reduced, it is evident (1) that the packers are 
not absorbing the tax, and (2) that they are not passing it on 
to the consumer. There is only one place left during this stage 
of the game where the effect of the tax can show up, and that 
is the market price that the farmer receives for his hogs. In 
the first stages of the corn-hog program before hog production 
is reduced, this open market price is depressed by approximate­
ly the full amount of the tax.
THE TAX IS SHIFTED TO THE PRODUCER
The question now arises, why does the packer, who acts as 
the go-between for the consumer and producer, with apparent­
ly the opportunity to pass the processing tax either or both 
ways, pass it only to the farmers, in the form of lower hog 
prices ?
We have already obse’rved why the tax cannot be put on the 
consumer. The consumer will immediately buy less pork, and 
the threat of unsold supplies will bring the price down again. 
And this works fast. The only time involved is the time it 
takes the family shopper to change her mind from purchasing 
pork to purchasing beef, mutton, eggs or other foods.
With the farmer, however, the situation is different. The 
length of time involved becomes an important factor. Produc­
tion is not so much a matter of changing one’s mind as it is of 
altering actual, physical numbers of live hogs. Even when the 
farmer makes up his mind to cut down production, his crop is 
usually determined for a year in advance by the hogs already 
in the feedlot and the sows already bred. In this situation, 
until hog production is reduced, the producer bears the full 
amount of the processing tax or any other increase in the costs 
of distribution.
Were it not for the fact that the Federal Government pur­
chased and slaughtered 6 million young pigs late last summer, 
hog producers would be sending a full run of hogs to market 
for àlmost a year after the tax was first applied. And during 
that time the market price of hogs would be depressed by ap­
proximately $2.25 per 100 pounds, the full amount of the tax. 
In that sense, then, the burden of the tax falls on hog producers 
as a group because the market price of their hogs is depressed ;
10
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though it must be remembered that the purpose of the tax is 
to provide funds for benefit payments to hog producers, and 
that these funds are flowing back to the hog producers, approx­
imately offsetting the burden of the tax. During the early 
stages of the program, then, before hog production is reduced, 
the Federal Government is simply taking money out of the 
hog farmer’s pocket with one hand and putting it back in an­
other pocket with the other.
THE MEANING OF OUR FINDINGS
Let us now sit back for a moment and think out what our 
findings in this first section of the bulletin mean. Remember 
that we are considering only one of the two major questions 
involved, namely, the question as to who pays the processing 
tax. We have found that before hog production is reduced, 
the packer is not paying the tax ; and we have also found that 
the consumer is not paying the tax either. Broadly speaking, 
so far, packers have no cause for complaint, and neither do 
consumers. The farmers are paying the tax themselves; the 
tax comes out of one overalls’ pocket, and goes back into an­
other pocket in the form of benefit payments for reducing hog 
production.
Does the program, then, mean simply that nothing is hap­
pening except that farmers and the AAA are going through a 
good deal of unnecessary motions and getting nowhere? It 
does not. For by going through these motions in cooperation 
with the AAA, farmers are preparing to bring about something 
that individually they could not accomplish without 10 or 20 
years of hardship and suffering—a substantial reduction of 
corn and hog production. The effects of this reduction will b 
considered in the next major section.
PARTICIPATING AND NON-PARTICIPATING PRODUCERS
Before we proceed to that discussion, however, we need to 
consider one further point. We have just seen that the effect 
of the tax, during the early stages of the program, is to lower 
the price of hogs. How is the burden of this lower price dis­
tributed among the farmers themselves?
The open market price of hogs is depressed approximately 
$2.25 per 100 pounds, the full amount of the tax. Those hog
11
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farmers who have signed corn-hog contracts are reimbursed by 
the receipt of the benefit payments, which roughly offset the 
effect of the lower price of hogs.9 But those who have not 
signed contracts receive no benefit payments. They simply net 
about $2.25 per 100 pounds less for their hogs than their con­
tract-signing neighbors.
The tax, therefore, acts as a penalty upon the farmer who 
does not participate in* the program, offset by whatever advan­
tage it may be to him to be free to maintain or expand his 
previous production. If the percentage sign-up is small, the 
tax will be small and the penalty not great. If the sign-up is 
high (as it gives promise of being) the tax will be high (as it 
is) and the penalty severe. In addition, if the price of hogs is 
low to begin with (as it has been) the depressing effect of the 
tax will drive hog prices so low that hog producers will be al­
most compelled to join the plan and receive the benefit pay­
ments. Those observers who object to the program as a whole 
will probably regard these features of the program as objection­
able coercion; those who approve of the program will no doubt 
regard these same features as strong points, since they are 
likely to lead to a large sign-up, and in addition insure that 
the chief benefits of the plan, will be restricted to those who 
participate.
WHO BEARS THE BURDEN OF REDUCED HOG 
PRODUCTION?
The question as to who really pays the hog processing tax is 
one thing. The question as to who is affected most by the pro­
posed reduction of hog production is another—and it requires 
more involved analysis. It is not just a question of changes 
in price per hundred pounds received by the producer for hogs, 
nor of margin per hundred pounds taken by the packer, nor of 
price per pound paid by the consumer, for pork. It becomes 
instead of a matter of 'price times quantity, a question of total
“This is the situation for the average corn-hog farmer, who raises 
corn as well as hogs. The case is somewhat different for farmers who 
raise very little gr no corn but a large number of hogs, and also for 
farmers who raise a very few or no hogs but a large quantity of corn. 
For a full discussion of their situation, see Iowa Agricultural Experi­
ment Station Bulletin 312, “Estimating Advantages of the Corn-Hog 
Plan to the Individual Farm,’’ by John A. Hopkins, Jr.
12
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volume of hog income received by hog producers, of total vol­
ume of margin taken by packers, and total volume of money 
paid by consumers for pork. For example, if a farmer raises 10 
bushels of potatoes one season and receives a dollar per bushel, 
and the next season raises 20 bushels but receives only 50 cents 
per bushel, his income in both instances cannot be considered 
in the light of prices alone; both price and quantity have to be 
taken into account.
This question, who bears the burden of the reduced hog pro­
duction (and therefore reduced consumption) is the subject 
of the second major section of this bulletin. In this second 
major section, the first sub-question to be dealt with is this: 
What is the effect of reduced hog production upon the total 
income of hog farmers? We all know that reducing hog pro­
duction will increase the price of hogs per 100 pounds; the 
question is, will it increase the price of hogs more or less than 
enough to offset the reduction? If hog production is reduced 
10 percent, farmers will get less money than before. But if 
price rises more than 10 percent, they will get more money than 
before.
REDUCED HOG PRODUCTION MEANS GREATER TOTAL
INCOME
The answer to the question, does reduced hog production 
mean greater total income, is to be found in fig. 4. This chart 
shows the effect of variations in annual hog supplies upon the 
price of hogs.
This chart is different from fig. 3 shown earlier. Figure 3 
shows the retail prices paid by consumers for different quan­
tities of pork. Figure 4 shows the prices paid by packers for 
different quantities of live hogs. The two curves show differ­
ent things.
This chart, fig. 4, shows that (during the period of years 
covered by the data) an increase of 10 percent in the supply of 
hogs depressed the prices about 20 percent; and conversely, a 
decrease in supply of 10 percent raised prices about 20 percent.
This means that if farmers had raised only 90 percent of 
their average production, prices would have risen 20 percent— 
and the price of 100 pounds of hog would have risen to 120 
percent of average. By multiplying 90 by 120 (amount, in
13
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percentage of average, times price in percentage of average), 
we get 10,800 or 108 percent of the amount farmers would have 
received for an average supply of hogs. That is, hog producers
would have received 8 
percent more money for 
their small 90 percent 
sized crop than they 
would have received for
DELATION OF U S . HOGS S L A U G H T E R E D  T O  
W E IG H TE D  FARM  PRICE O F H OGS PEE IOO LBS
U S .  H O G S  S L A U G H T E R E D  (P E R C E N T )
Fig. 4. This chart shows the relation 
of hog production in the United States 
to the farm price of hogs per hundred 
pounds (1921 to 1933).
an average crop.
The relation between 
hog supplies and hog 
prices shown in fig. 4 
may have changed some­
what during the current 
depression. The prelim­
inary research embodied 
in fig. 4 indicates, how­
ever, that if any change 
has occurred it has been 
slight. If further re­
search confirms this find­
ing, and shows that the 
curve has remained sub­
stantially as it was be­
fore the depression (ex­
cept for its obvious 
downward shift) then 
the percentage effect of 
a reduction in the pro­
duction of hogs upon the gross hog income of hog producers 
should be roughly the same now as before the depression. We 
have just seen that when hog production is reduced 10 percent, 
gross income rises 8 percent. If hog production is cut 15 per­
cent, gross income would rise 10.5 percent. If it is cut 20 per­
cent, the gross income might rise 12 percent, although this is 
conjectural ; we have not had a reduction as great as 20 percent 
since the war, so we are not sure what its effect would be. Fur­
ther reductions would probably begin to exercise a progressive­
ly smaller upward influence on gross income.
14
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We have just seen that a reduction of 15 or 20 percent, and 
possibly more, increases gross income considerably. It is fur­
ther evident that it increases net income, or profits, more than 
it increases gross income. For it costs less to raise a small crop 
of hogs than it does to raise an average or large crop ; not less 
per hog, but less total cost. A reduction in production, there­
fore, not only results in greater total income but also in lower 
total cost. Profits therefore increase more rapidly than total 
income increases.
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SLAUGHTER OF LIGHT­
WEIGHT PIGS IN 1933
We are now in a position to discuss the effect of the Federal 
Government’s purchases of lightweight hogs in 1933.
These purchases amounted to 6,200,000 head, equivalent to 
about 15 percent of a normal winter’s run of hogs. One might 
think, therefore, that the removal of this number of hogs from 
the winter market of early 1934 would raise the price of hogs 
30 percent.10
This estimate, however, is almost certainly too high. When 
packers buy hogs in the winter, they take into account not only 
the supplies available then, but also the supplies likely to be 
available later on in thé summer when their surplus pork will 
be coming out of storage. That is, one should estimate the per­
centage that 6,200,000 head of hogs constitutes of a normal run 
of hogs, not just during the winter months, but during the 9 
or 10 winter and following spring and summer months. This 
percentage would be 10 or 12, rather than the 15 given above.11 
Furthermore, many of the lightweight pigs were runts and 
would not have developed into good hogs if they had grown 
to maturity. This would bring the percentage reduction down 
closer to 10 than to 12, and this would raise the price 20 per­
cent rather than 30 percent.
“This is the estimate made in “Agricultural Adjustment. A report of 
Administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, May, 1933, to 
February, 1934.” U.S.D.A. 1934, p. 253.
“FitzGerald in his “Corn and Hogs Under the AAA,” p. 102, esti­
mates that “the emergency (hog buying) campaign should reduce 
1933-34 federally inspected slaughter by 9 percent,” that is, 9 per­
cent of a 12 months’ run of hogs.
15
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From January, 1934, to the end of June, 1934, hog prices at 
Chicago have averaged about $4 per hundred pounds. It is 
evident that they would have been lower than this if the Fed­
eral Government’s 1933 pig slaughtering program had not re­
moved 10 percent of the supply of hogs. The price of $4 per 
100 pounds is the price for the 90 percent supply. That is, the 
price of $4 is 20 percent higher than it would have been for a 
full run of hogs; it represents 120 percent of the price that 
would have existed if a full run of hogs had been coming to
market. The price, then, would have been J ^ l o f  $4 or $3.33,
120 j ’
instead of $4. The Government’s 1933 pig slaughter therefore 
raised the price of hogs during the early part of 1934 by about 
65 cents per 100 pounds.12
EFFECT OF POSSIBLE 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN 
HOG PRODUCTION
Let us now consider the prospects for the coming winter, of 
1934-35 and thereafter.
When this study was begun, it was expected that 1934-35 
hog supplies would be reduced perhaps 15 or 20 percent by the 
AAA corn-hog program. The June, 1934, pig survey, which 
has just been issued, indicates that the 1934 spring and fall pig 
crops taken together are likely to be 31 percent smaller than 
last year. This reduction resulted from the drouth as well as 
the AAA program.
The reduction in market receipts will probably not be as 
great as the reduction in pig crop, for market receipts include 
old breeding stock as well as new crop hogs. Furthermore, 
the scarcity and higher price of hogs will probably cause them 
to be fed to heavier weights. If market receipts of hogs, in 
tonnage, is reduced 20 percent, hog producers as a group would 
receive roughly 80X14(1=11,200, or 12 percent more for that 
smaller crop than for an average crop.
12The effect of the government’s subsequent purchases of pork for 
relief purposes is difficult to determine. It undoubtedly increased the 
price of hogs to some extent, because the pork went to unemployed and 
other people who would have eaten less pork if they had had to buy it 
themselves. How much less, however, is not .known. In any case, 
the relief buying is not an integral part of the AAA program. For 
these reasons, its effect is not discussed here.
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Where would this extra 12 percent of money come from ? It 
must come either from the packers and other distributors, or 
from the consumers.
At first glance it would seem that it could not come from the 
packers. Figure 2 shows that their net margin remained rough­
ly constant throughout the period from September, 1933, to 
the end of May, 1934; if the packers were able to preserve their 
margin then, they will probably continue to preserve it in the 
future. Other distributor’s margins are not likely to change 
either.
One would suppose, then, that the extra farm income would 
come from the consumers. Yet fig. 3 has shown, earlier in this 
article, that the consumer’s demand for retail pork is more 
elastic than that for live hogs as shown in fig. 4; so that when 
pork supplies are reduced 20 percent, consumers will pay only 
20 percent more (not 40 percent, like the buyers of live hogs 
do as shown in fig. 4). That is, consumers pay more per pound, 
but only enough more to offset the smaller number of pounds 
they buy. They do not pay any more, total money for a small 
amount of pork products than they do for a large amount.
The extra money received by farmers for a small crop of 
hogs, therefore, cannot come from consumers. One might 
think, then, that consumers will not feel any ill effects of the 
corn-hog program. But this is not correct. Consumers will not 
be paying out more money for pork, it is true; but they will 
be getting 20 percent less pork for their money than before. 
Presumably they will have to spend more money for all foods 
than before, because they will have to buy larger quantity of 
other foods to make up for the 20 percent less pork they will 
buy if hog production is reduced 20 percent.
PACKERS MAY INCREASE THEIR MARGINS
This might seem to indicate that the extra 12 percent income 
received by hog farmers will come out of the packers, after all; 
not bcause they pay it out of their margins, but because their 
volume will have been reduced say 20 percent, so that their 
previous margin per 100 pounds, multiplied by their reduced 
volume, will bring them in only 80 percent of their previous 
total income.
17
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This at once raises a question. Will the packers be content 
simply to retain their previous margin per hundred pounds 
when supplies of hogs are reduced and their total volume of 
business is cut 20 percent? Will they not naturally seek to in­
crease their margin per hundred pounds, enough to offset the 
reduced volume? They would not need to increase their mar­
gin a full 20 percent, because they handle other products be­
sides pork, and not all of their costs are fixed. But a large 
proportion of their costs are fixed, and they would probably 
attempt to increase their margins somewhat.
It is almost certain, however, that packers all over the coun­
try would not suffer a uniform 20 percent decrease in volume. 
They would all fight to maintain their volume, and those who 
were most advantageously situated would fight more effectively 
than the others. Some packers might be able to continue get­
ting as many hogs as before, so that the effect of the total re­
duction would be concentrated upon the other packers. The 
eventual result might be that margins would be little if 
any wider than before.
What about the margins taken by other middlemen—for 
example, by retailers ? These margins bulk considerably larger 
than those of the packers. In all probability, these margins 
will remain unaffected by the reduction in volume. These 
middlemen handle many other products besids pork, and a 
reduction in pork volume would be only a small item in their 
total income. In any case it probably would be largely offset 
by increases in the volume of other foods. The same thing is 
true of the margins taken by transportation agencies. And in 
any case, transportation margins are notoriously sluggish, 
changing very slowly if at all, over periods of many years.
We may summarize, then, by saying that (1) consumers will 
be, paying as much money for the reduced pork supply as be­
fore, and that (2) packer’s and other margins per pound will re­
main substantially unchanged, so that the total margin or total 
income of packers and other handlers will be reduced, and 
therefore (3) farmers’ incomes will be increased by an amount 
equal to the de6reased income received by packers and other 
handlers of pork.
Packers will probably consider this an unwarranted transfer
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of income from themselves to hog farmers. Farmers will prob­
ably point out, in reply, that they (the farmers) have borne 
much more of the decline in consumer expenditures for pork 
since 1929 than the packers have (fig. 1 in the first part of this 
bulletin shows that this reply would be correct) and that a 
transfer of some incopie from packers to farmers now would 
only partially redress the balance. They could further claim 
that a partial restoration of agriculture’s purchasing power, 
even though it be at the expense of other groups, is likely to 
speed up recovery for all groups; though here they would be 
on more controversial ground.
EFFECT OF PROGRAM ON CONTRACT SIGNERS AND 
NON-SIGNERS
The final question is the differential effect of the program 
upon contract signers and non-signers.
Those who sign the contract and reduce production 25 per­
cent will receive a benefit payment of $5 per head on the re­
maining 75 percent of their hogs. This is equivalent to re­
ceiving about $2.25 per 100 pounds (the amount of the hog 
processing tax) on the hogs they continue to produce; it is 
also equivalent to $15 per head for the hogs they do not raise. 
And $15 per head is equivalent, at average weights (230 pounds 
* per hog), to about $6.50 per hundred pounds.
Those who do not sign up will rOceive the same open market 
price for hogs as those who do sign u p ; but they will receive no 
benefit payments. . The use of specific figures will make this 
« part of the question concrete. Suppose that the farm price for
hogs, had there been no AAA program, would average $4 per 
hundred during 1934. A 20 percent reduction in total hog pro­
duction would raise this price 40 percent, or $1.60, to $5.60. 
If this reduction had been accompanied by the imposition of a 
processing tax of $2 per hundred (which is perhaps about what 
the actual tax will average) the farm price would be reduced 
from $5.60 to $3.60.
The non-signer, therefore, will receive $3.60 per hundred 
pounds, whereas if there had been no program at all he would 
fmye received $4. He will be thus somewhat worse off than be­
fore, in absolute terms. And in relative terms, he will be con­
siderably worse off than his neighbors who have signed con-
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tracts. For his neighbors will be receiving the same market 
price for their hogs as he, but will be producing only 75 percent 
as many hogs, and will be receiving $6.50 per hundred pounds, 
clear, for the hogs they do not raise. This is considerably more 
than the non-signer receives, gross, for the hogs he raises. And 
it is certainly much more than he can ever hope to clear from 
the last 25 percent of his hogs.
The penalizing effect on the non-signer is severe if the gen­
eral level of hog prices is low. If the level is high, however, 
the penalizing effect will be partly offset by the non-signers’ 
freedom to expand his hog production and take advantage of 
the high hog prices. It is evident, however, that hog prices 
would have to go very high—over $10, for illustration-before 
this effect would be very great.13
SUMMARY
It appears, then, that in the early stages of the AAA pro­
gram before hog production is reduced, the burden of the 
processing tax on hogs is not being borne by the packer, nor 
passed on to the consumer, but is being passed back to the pro­
ducer in the form of lower market prices for hogs. The market 
price of hogs during the first part of 1934 would have been de­
pressed by approximately $2.25, the full amount of the tax, had 
not the 1933 Federal Government slaughter of lightweight pigs 
reduced supplies somewhat. This reduction in supplies offset 
part, perhaps 65 cents, of the full depressing effect of the tax. 
The net reduction in hog prices, then, was probably about $1.60.
After hog production is reduced, the situation changes. If 
hog production is reduced 20 percent by the AAA program, 
consumers will then pay about 20 percent more per pound of 
retail pork products. Since their demand curve for pork has 
an elasticity of unity, their total outlay for pork products will 
remain roughly constant. Their outlay for all food will be in­
creased, however, since they will need to buy more of other 
foods to make up for the 20 percent less pork they buy. Pro­
ducers of other foods will, therefore, benefit to some extent.
“For a full discussion of this question, see Iowa Agricultural Ex­
periment Station Bulletin 312, “Estimating Advantages of the Corn- 
Hog Plan to the Individual Farm,” by John A. Hopkins, Jr.
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Farmers should receive larger total returns from their small 
production, since the packer demand curve for hogs has a 
slope of about —.5, which is less than unity. This extra income 
cannot come from pork consumers, as has just been shown. It 
must come from the packers, because of their reduced volume 
of slaughter and consequently smaller total income from slaugh­
tering hogs. Packers may increase their margins to offset their 
reduced volume, but since their total costs will be reduced on 
account of their smaller volume, the percentage increase in 
their margin should be substantially less than the percentage 
reduction in their volume. To that extent, the gross hog in­
come to hog farmers as a group, reduced by the tax but in­
creased by the benefit payments, should be greater than before. 
The increase in the profits of hog farmers as a group (or the 
decrease in their losses) will be still greater than the increase 
in their income, since their total costs will have been lowered 
because they will be producing fewer hogs; their gross income 
will be greater, their total costs will be less, and their net profits 
should be greater than before.
Within the farming group, those who have not signed con­
tracts to reduce hog production will receive the same open mar­
ket prices for hogs as those who have signed up, but will receive 
no benefit payments. Whether their gross income will be great­
er or less than if they signed up will depend upon the extent 
to which they expand their hog production without incurring 
sharply increased unit costs, and upon the extent to which hog 
prices rise substantially above present levels.
It seems, then, that (a) as far as the incidence of the process­
ing tax is concerned, farmers “ pay the processing tax” them­
selves, in the sense that the price they receive for hogs is $2.25 
per hundred lower than if no tax were being applied; but they 
are reimbursed by benefit payments from the Federal Govern­
ment arising from the collection of the tax: (b) consumers will 
not pay the processing tax, but will bear a large part of the in­
cidence of the effect of the reduction in hog production; they 
will receive, say, 20 percent less pork while paying out as 
much money as they used to pay for a full amount of pork; and 
(c) packers will take a smaller total volume of margin from 
the “ consumer’s pork dollar” than before, even though their
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margin per pound may be increased, because of the reduced 
volume of pork they will handle. As a result, therefore, it ap­
pears that farmers will receive more gross money income, for 
raising fewer hogs, than before the program was put into ef­
fect ; and their profits should be substantially increased.
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